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INDUSTRIAL LAW CASES 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: 
THE "GREY AREA11 
Inspector of Awards v Caxton Printing Works Ltd. 
Industrial Court, Auckl and. 26 May 1977 (I.C. 19/ 77). Jamieson J . 
The Inspector of Awards came to the 
Industrial Court in September 1975, seeking 
arrears of wages for the use of several wor-
kers under Printing Employees Awards from 
1971 through 197 4. The action was set 
aside, pending decision by the Court of 
Appeal on the proper statutory limitation 
period. The Industrial Relations Act now in 
force allows a claim to be made, under 
Section 158, within six years after the wages 
become due and payable. By that provision, 
the Inspector would seem to be able to 
recover all the wages sought. However, the 
statutory limitation of the Industrial Concili-
ation and Arbitration Act 1954. s 211 , allow-
ed only a two-year reach backward. In 
Inspector of Awards v Malcolm Furlong Ltd. 
(1977) 1 NZLR 36, noted 1n these pages at 
{1976) 1 NZJ I R 7 4, the Court of Appeal 
decided that the six-year statute of limita-
tions under the new Act could only apply 
to awa rds and col lective agreements made 
under the new Industrial Commission and 
not to awards made by the old Court of 
Arbitration. 
The present action fills the gap, called a 
" grey area" by the Court, concerning 
awards made by the Court of Arbitration, 
but still in effect on 8 March 197 4 when the 
transition from the old I.C. and A. Act and 
the new Industrial Relations Act took place. 
By the operation of s 20A (1) of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1924 and s 236 (8) of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1973, those 
awards of the Arbitration Court in effect 
on 8 March 1974 are to be treated as 
awards made by the Industrial Commission 
The Inspector, therefore, can recover, under 
s 158, arrears from 1973 under those 
awards only, and not awards which had 
expired before March 1974. ® 
COUNTRY TRAVELLER: WORKER OR 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR? 
Inspector of Awards v Mineral Additives Ltd. 
Industrial Court, Hasti ngs. 15 June 1977 (I.C. 26/77). Jamieson J. 
The defendant company, a manufacturer 
and distributor of agncultural fertilizers, 
entered into an oral agreement in late 1972 
with Mr D. E. Lindsay, whereby the latter 
was to act as a travelling sales agent for 
the company. Lindsay was to receive 30°/o 
of his sales revenue as commission, plus 
certain expenses. The plaintiff, a Department 
of Labour Inspector of Awards, sought 
ar rears of wages for Lindsay for the period 
October 1972 to November 1974, under 
Clause 5 of the Warehousemen 's Award. 
recorded at 72 B.A. 589, and under the 
relevant clauses o f subsequent updated 
awards. In particular, the Inspector claimed 
that Lindsay was a 
''country traveller . . . , wholly or 
substantially engaged outside of the 
town and suburbs thereof in which the 
warehouse is situated . . . " 
(Clause 5 (c) ). 
Country travellers under that Clause were 
to receive a minimum weekly wage of 
$58.61, which had not been paid to Lindsay. 
If Lindsay was an employee of the com-
pany, then he was covered by the award 
and would recover. If Lindsay was, on the 
other hand, an independent con tractor, 
then he was not covered by the award, and 
he would not recover. 
The Court noted that Li ndsay was paid 
monthly, with Inland Revenue deductions 
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made by the Company These two factors 
pornted toward a contract of employment. 
On the other hand, the court concluded 
that Lindsay did not work regularly and 
drd not make many sales. Although he used 
hrs own car, his 'expenses · were related 
to sales, not mileage. In addition the court 
found that Lindsay had taken up a full-time 
job, with another employer, without telling 
the Company. In fact, he neither resigned 
nor notified the Company of his return after 
leaving the other employer. The Company 
exercised little or no control over Lindsay, 
although they drd, from time to time, refer 
potential customers to him. Lindsay never 
asked for time off and he never received 
holiday pay. 
Following past practice the court refused 
to be bound by any particular test, such as 
the "control" test or the "integration" test, 
but chose to take "a broad view of the 
whole of the circumstances." In this case, 
the " broad view" revealed that Lindsay was 
not an employee, but an independent con-
tractor, and therefore, was unable to recover 
arrears of wages. (For similar recent deci-
sions, which lead to the opposite conclu-
sion, see notes at (1976) 1 NZJIR 19 and 
(1975) 1 N.Z. Recent Law (N.S.) 312). @ 
PERSONAL GRIEVANCE: INDIVIDUAL APPEAL TO 
THE INDUSTRIAL COURT 
Franich v Air New Zealand Ltd. 
Industrial Court, Auckland. 8 August 1977 (I.C. 32/77). Jamieson J . 
The applicant Fronich was dismissed in 
March 1976 by the respondent employer 
In April 1976 the Executive Committee of 
the Aircraft Workers Union resolved not to 
pursue a personal grievance on behalf of 
Franich. The unused grievance machinery, 
set out in the Air New Zealand, National 
Airways Corporation, Safe Air Ltd, Aircraft 
Workers Collective Agreement recorded at 
76 B A. 5253, follows the standard proced-
ure contained rn s 117 of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973 ("the Act '). That stand-
ard procedure. of course, gives standrng to 
the aggrieved worker's unron and his 
employer, not to the aggrieved worker him-
self. Therefore, the decision of the Union 
in April 1976 was conclusive under the Act : 
Franrch at that stage could only pursue a 
common Jaw remedy for wrongful dismissal 
in the ordinary courts. 
However, by s 19 of the Industrial Rela-
tions Amendment Act (No. 2) 1976, which 
came into force in November 1976, the 
Industrial Court may give leave to a worker 
to come drrectly to the Court, without going 
through the gnevance procedure set out in 
s 117 (4) of the Act, when either the wor-
ker's unron or the employer fails ~< to act 
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promptly" in accordance with the statutory 
procedure. That new procedure was first 
successfully used in Dee v Kensington 
Haynes and White, I. C. 21/77, noted at 
(1977) 2 NZJIR 54. 
In the rnstant case, however, the Court 
ruled that Franich could not avail himself 
of the November statute, because his per-
sonal grievance with the employer came to 
an end in April with the Union resolution. 
The November Amendment created no retro-
spec tive or retroactive rights for extinct, 
historical disputes. 
Although not decided by the Court, this 
decision presumably leaves open a dismis-
sal which occurred before November 1976, 
but which was still being discussed by the 
union and employer. As both the principal 
Act and the Amendment refer to prompt 
settlement, it seems unlikely that anyone 
dismissed before November 1976 could now 
make use of the Amendment. In any event, 
it should be remembered that the Amend-
ment does not create a right to go to the 
Industrial Court-the Amendment only cre-
ates a privilege for the worker to ask leave 
to refer the matter to the Court. ® 
J 
REGISTRATION OF UNREGISTERED SOCIETY: 
APPEAL AGAINST REGISTRAR 1S DECISION 
Northern Industrial District Graphic Designers, Artists and Related 
Craftsmen's Guild v N.Z. Printing Trades Industrial Union of Workers 
Industrial Court, Auckland. 18 August 1977. Jamieson J. 
The appellant Guild applied to the Regi-
strar of Industrial Unions for registration as 
an industrial union of workers. The 
Registrar declined to register the Guild as 
a union, on the grounds that the members 
of the Guild might conveniently belong to 
certain existing unions (See s 168 (2) of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1973). The 
unsuccessful Guild then appealed to the 
Industrial Court, under s 168 ( 4) of the Act, 
seeking to reverse the Registrar's decision. 
Three un1ons appeared in the Industrial 
Court to oppose the appeal , betng the 
Printers, the Shop Assistants an d the Photo 
Engravers~ and a fourth respondent , the 
Clerical Workers, made no official appear-
, 
ance. 
The Court held that the appellant Guild 
failed to show on the grounds of distance 
or diversity of interest or on any other sub-
stantial ground that it would be more 
convenient for their members to register 
separately as a union than to belong to 
existing unions. A case had been made out 
for separate coverage of the Guild mem-
bers within the Printing Trades Union, but 
there was no showing that there should be 
a separate union. 
This decision should be compared w1th 
two previous such appeals to the Industrial 
Court, noted at (1976) 1 N.Z.J.I.R. 45, 
involving the Universities Technicians Asso-
ciation and the Totalisator Employees 
Assoc1ation respective ly. The University 
Technicians successfully showed (1) that 
their members had special interests and 
skills setting them apart from existing 
unions, and (2) that less than half of their 
membership were elig ible to join any exist-
ing union. The Totalis~tor Workers on the 
other hand failed in the Industrial Court and 
subsequently lost an appeal to the Supreme 
Court. 
Counsel for the Totalisator Workers argu-
ed that their membership could not con-
veniently join "a then existing union", per 
s 168 (2) . but in fact would be sp read over 
several existing unions. Wild C. J. in the 
Supreme Court disposed of that argument 
by reference to s 7 of the Acts I nterpreta-
tion Act 1924, which requires that singular 
words (such as ''a then existing union") 
include the plural. Coincidentally, three 
existing unions appeared in each of these 
three cases to oppose the application. (See 
also the appeal by the Tasman-Kaingaroa 
Staff Association Inc., noted at (1977) N.Z. 
Recent Law 51 . In that case the Court re-
fused to reverse the Registrar's decision, 
but the Court did make constructive sug-
gestions about the Association's member-
ship rules). ® 
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